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SUEDEEN G. KELLY
Regulatory Reform of the U.S.
Natural Gas Industry:
A Summing Up
INTRODUCTION
Until recently the natural gas industry was perhaps the most compre-
hensively regulated business in the United States. It has been subject to
state and federal regulation of prices, profits, entry, and production levels.
Classical regulation of the price of natural gas at the wellhead' led, at
least in part,2 to severe natural gas shortages in the mid-1970s. Not
surprisingly, the shortages led U.S. policymakers to reconsider the de-
sirability of pervasive regulation of this industry. Upon reconsideration,
Congress decided to phase out the regulation of gas prices at the wellhead
over the next nine years.' Since then federal and state regulators as well
as state legislatures have taken additional steps to increase competition
in the natural gas industry. Indeed, there appears to be a growing con-
sensus in all three branches of the federal government, in many state
governments, and even among the members of the industry of the need
for and wisdom of deregulation. This is not to say, however, that members
of the industry are happy about the way in which deregulation is being
implemented. As the preceding articles testify, each member of the in-
dustry feels it has been hurt more by the changes than any other member.
And the consumer feels he has not received the full benefits of compe-
tition. Despite these complaints, however, neither the industry nor the
public has quarrelled with the central notion of regulatory reform of the
natural gas business.
As explained in the first article, regulatory reform and changes in gas
market conditions have cast the industry into turmoil. The purpose of this
article is to attempt to determine where the industry is headed and to
analyze whether this is an appropriate direction.
To determine where the gas industry is headed we must speak in terms
of each member of the industry, for each has been affected differently by
the regulatory reforms. We must also begin with a clear picture of what
!. The price of gas "at the wellhead" means the price being charged by the producer.
2. One other factor was the average price rate design favored by state and federal regulators. For
a discussion of the relationship between regulation and the gas shortages of the 1970s, see 51 Fed.
Reg. 22,173 (1986); S. BREYER, REGULAnoN AND rrs RErw,.t 243-53 (1982).
3. This was enacted into law in 1978 as the Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432
(1982).
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the relationships among the members of the industry have been and of
what the U.S. natural gas policy was prior to reform. Next, we must
understand in some detail what regulatory reforms have taken place. Then,
finally, we will be able to discern as clearly as possible the direction the
industry is taking and the hurdles it needs to cross to get there.
THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY DEFINED
Members of the natural gas industry traditionally fall into three cate-
gories: producers, pipelines companies and local distribution companies.
The five states with the most production are Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
Alaska and New Mexico.4 However, all but nineteen of the states produce
natural gas.' As a preceding article explains, today, foreign producers are
also significant sellers of gas in the U.S.
Pipeline companies are either interstate or intrastate companies. Inter-
state pipelines are those that are engaged in the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce, or in the sale in interstate commerce of gas
for resale.Intrastate pipelines are those that transport gas within the bor-
ders of a state, or into a foreign state, without at any point crossing the
border of another state of the U.S. Interstate pipelines are regulated by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), while intrastate
pipelines are regulated-if regulated at all-by a state regulatory body.6
The third traditional member of the industry is the local distribution
company, commonly called an "LDC". The local distribution company
receives its gas through one or more pipelines and distributes it to indi-
vidual consumers. LDC's are viewed as natural monopolies and are reg-
ulated by state regulatory agencies.7
With the advent of regulatory reform and increased competition in the
price and sources of natural gas, the "independent reseller" has arguably
emerged as a new member of the natural gas industry.' Prior to regulatory
reform, the purchase and reselling of gas was performed almost entirely
by pipeline companies. Today, there are gas marketing companies (which
may or may not be affiliated with a pipeline) that purchase and resell gas.
There are also gas brokers who arrange for the purchase of gas directly
by an end-user. Now that many consumers can choose from whom they
wish to buy gas, the independent resellers play an important role in the
gas business.
4. AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, GAS FACTS, 1984 DATA 28 (1985).
5. id.
6. Some states, most notably Texas, do not regulate intrastate pipeline companies. See H. BROADMAN,
REGULATORY REFORM OF INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINES, E-85-15 KENNEDY SCHOOL OF Gov-
ERNMENT ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CENTER 47 (Dec. 1985).
7. Municipally-owned LDC's are usually not regulated by the state.
8. This term is borrowed from James Piccone and Drew Reimer. See infra note 33.
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WHERE WE HAVE BEEN: A SUMMARY OF PAST NATURAL GAS
POLICY AND RESULTANT INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS
Producers
Producers were not regulated by the federal government until 1954.
In that year, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC) decision and held that the Natural Gas Act of 1938' au-
thorized federal regulation of the price at which a producer sold gas to
an interstate pipeline (that is, gas which went into interstate commerce).'"
The subsequent attempt by Congress to enact legislation to remove this
power was defeated. So, the FPC was faced with the depressing prospect
of using classical cost-of-service ratemaking to regulate the price of a
product which was not produced by monopolists. The FPC first regulated
producers on a case-by-case basis but that quickly proved unworkable.
Next, the agency 4 et price on an areawide average price basis. Finally,
it set an average national price. With hindsight we can clearly see that
this approach resulted in a price too low to provide sufficient profit to
keep up production reserves. Between 1968 and 1976, the interstate
reserves-to-production ratio fell from 16.8 to 8.6. The American public
felt the shortage in the mid-1970s when the existing reserves were de-
pleted. As noted above, this caused Congress to re-evaluate the wisdom
of wellhead price controls and to pass a law phasing them out.
Producers in many states have also long been subject to state regulation
of production under "prorationing statutes"." Pursuant to a typical stat-
ute, state regulatory agencies set monthly allowable volumes for each
well. Although a producer is allowed to produce above or below this
level in any given month, over a set period of time he must balance his
production so as to produce the "allowable" level. If a producer consis-
tently overproduces a well, it can be shut in. If he consistently under-
produces a well, he can lose his right to make up that underproduction.
The oft-stated purpose of this regulation is to conserve gas and protect
correlative rights. Protection of correlative rights means prohibiting one
well from draining gas of another well located in the same pool of gas.
There is also evidence that in the past, some states have used their
prorationing authority to set production levels at volumes below the true
demand for gas, thereby raising its market price. 2 Following the logic
of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, 3 discussed infra, leads one to
conclude that state prorationing regulation which directly or indirectly
9. 15 U.S.C. §§717-717w (1982).
10. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
11. These states include, for example, Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas.
12. See R. PIERCE, STATE NoN-UTILrry REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, TRANSPOR-
TATION AND MARKETING, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. INST. ON NATURAL GAS MKTG. (1987).
13. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Mississippi Oil and Gas Board, 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
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affects the price of gas would violate the Natural Gas Policy Act and be
unconstitutional. 4 Thus, states are presently rethinking the legality and
advisability of their production regulations.
Under this regime of regulation, then, producers did business primarily
with pipeline companies. The pipelines hooked up their wells, bought
their gas from the wells and transported it to market. Producers had little
or no contact with local distribution companies or end-users.
Interstate Pipelines
Interstate pipelines have been regulated by the federal government
under the Natural Gas Act 6 since it was passed by Congress in 1938.
The prices pipelines charge their customers (usually LDC's) for both gas
and transmission of that gas have been regulated through classical cost-
of-service ratemaking. Pipelines have also been subject to regulation of
entry, which requires them to obtain permission to buy and sell gas to
particular customers.
The transportation of gas has traditionally been viewed as a natural
monopoly 7 and has been regulated as such. However, the marketing of
gas (the purchase of gas from producers and its resale to LDC's and end-
users) is not a "natural" monopoly. As discussed below, federal and state
governments have recently taken steps to inject more competition into
the provision of this service.
The purchasing practices of interstate pipelines have been regulated by
many gas producing states. Under "common purchaser" statutes, states
have required a pipeline wishing to buy gas from a particular well to take
gas ratably from all other wells in the same pool. As with the production
regulation discussed above, the purpose of this requirement is to protect
the correlative rights of owners of wells in a common pool. Again, like
producer regulation, these statutes are coming under attack for indirectly
affecting the price of gas, and thereby violating the Natural Gas Policy
Act.
Intrastate Pipelines
Intrastate pipelines have been regulated similarly to interstate pipelines,
but by the state in which they are located, not by the federal government.
In short, intrastate pipelines are commonly subject to cost-of-service
14. See PIERCE, supra note 12.
15. On occasion producers did make direct sales to industrial end-users.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§717-717w (1982).
17. Some markets are served by more that one pipeline, and at least one commentator has called
for deregulation of transportation. See Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition
in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REv. 2 (1983).
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ratemaking regulation, entry controls, and state common purchaser acts.
Intrastate pipelines have routinely functioned in intrastate commerce
just as interstate pipelines function in interstate commerce. That is, they
purchase gas either directly from producers or from interstate pipelines,
transport that gas, and then resell it to LDC's and, sometimes, to large
industrial end-users. Typically they have no contact with the mass of gas
consumers.
Local Distribution Companies
Privately owned local distribution companies" are subject to classical
cost-of-service ratemaking regulation. Typically they have bought gas "at
the city gate" from one or more interstate or intrastate pipeline companies,
then transported it and resold it to individual consumers. Their transpor-
tation function is recognized as a natural monopoly. Until recently they
also held a monopoly, though not necessarily a natural one, on the mar-
keting of gas to individual consumers. Usually the state awards them a
franchise to transport gas, that is, a territory exclusively serviced by
them. 9 Ordinarily, LDC's do not engage in business with producers.
Foreign Gas Producers
As discussed in a preceding article, prior to 1984, the price of gas
imports into the U.S. was strictly regulated both by us and by the exporting
nations. Because these prices were higher than domestic prices, little
imported gas was consumed in the U.S.
U.S. NATURAL GAS REGULATORY REFORM
There have been four major U.S. policy changes in the regulation of
the natural gas industry which have set the stage for a more competitive
market in the sale and distribution of natural gas and a concomitant
restructuring of the industry itself.
Deregulation of Gas Prices
The passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) by Congress in
1978 signaled a break with the past philosophy of pervasive regulation
of the industry. The NGPA most notably provided for the phasing out of
regulation of gas prices. By July 1, 1987, the price of all gas, except old
gas, will be set by the marketplace.2°
18. There are also municipally owned local distribution companies.
19. Old gas is gas produced from wells which were dedicated to interstate commerce on Nov. 8,
1978 and for which a just and reasonable rate under the Natural Gas Act was in effect on that date
for a first sale of natural gas. 15 U.S.C. § 3314 (1982).
20. The NGPA allowed states to regulate the price of intrastate gas from wells drilled prior to
Nov. 1978. Today, no state regulates the price of intrastate gas.
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In eliminating wellhead regulation the NGPA correctly recognized that
production of gas is not a natural monopoly. Indeed, there are between
40 and 50 integrated producers and between 2000 and 3000 independent
operators producing in the U.S. To the extent that price regulation had
been used to control perceived excess producer profits (also called eco-
nomic rents), the NGPA at least implicitly recognizes that control of such
profit2 should come-if it comes at all-through the tax system. Con-
gress' notion that a competitive market in the sale of natural gas could
be achieved has been accepted by the executive and judicial branches of
government as well.
In the executive branch, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) was given the authority to set the price of old gas-that gas
which was not deregulated by the NGPA. The NGPA initially set the
price of this old gas at a very low level. Needless to say, producers wanted
to see the price of this gas set higher, while consumers were happy with
it at the NGPA price. FERC, wishing to have the price of old gas also
set by the marketplace, but realizing the political pitfalls of attempting
such a move, produced a compromise regulatory policy in 1986. FERC
provided that producers could receive "just and reasonable" prices for
old gas under contract if it undertook good faith renegotiation of contracts
to raise the price of old gas, as well as renegotiation of contracts to lower
the price for certain higher-priced gas sold to the same pipeline (FERC
Order 451).2 In short, the executive branch's actions have furthered the
congressional intent to have the price of gas set by the marketplace.
The judicial branch has also supported the functioning of a competitive
market in the sale of natural gas. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court in a
five-to-four decision in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Mississippi
Oil and Gas Board,23 invalidated a Mississippi regulatory order issued
pursuant to its common purchaser act. The Order in question was a direct
application of Mississippi's common purchaser act. It required a pipeline
to take ratably from a well interest owner with which it did not have a
contract. The well interest owner's gas was in a common pool with other
wells with which the pipeline company did have a contract and from
which it was taking gas. The noncontracted for gas was being sold at a
higher rate than the gas which the pipeline company had contracted for.
The court correctly found that the enforcement of the Mississippi Order
would have an effect on the price being paid for gas. The court found
21. For a discussion of federal regulation of natural gas prices as a means to control producer
economic rents, see BREYER, supra note 2, at 242-47.
22. Ceiling Prices: Old Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. §§ 154, 157, 270, 271, 284) (FERC Order 451).
23. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
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that Congress' intent in passing the NGPA was to have the marketplace
determine the price of gas. Thus, the court concluded, Congress not only
prohibited the federal government from regulating the price of gas, but
also prohibited state governments from directly or indirectly regulating
the price of gas.
The decision in Transco was followed a few weeks later by action in
Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Commission of Kansas 7
The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the Kansas Supreme
Court for action consistent with its opinion in Transco. In Northwest
Central Pipeline, the Kansas Supreme Court had upheld an order of the
Corporation Commission which amended the basic proration order for
the Kansas-Hugoton gas field. The order was amended to require chron-
ically underproduced well owners to increase their production to bring
the field back into balance with the takes of other well owners or to forfeit
their right to produce that gas in the future. In reaching its decision, the
Kansas Supreme Court had found that this Order was an exercise of
Kansas' power to regulate gas production, and was not preempted by
federal law. On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
its prior opinion." We must await the next decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in this case to discover whether the states are free to regulate
production in any respect.
In September of 1986, a federal district court in Oklahoma relied on
the reasoning of the Transco decision, and ruled that Oklahoma ratable
take regulation was also preempted by the NGPA.26 This case is on appeal.
Should it be upheld, it and Transco appear to sound the death knell for
the traditional means that states have used to protect correlative rights
and achieve conservation. This is not to say that states would be without
other means to achieve these goals. But these other means must also
comply with the goals of the NGPA as interpreted by the Court, that is,
that the supply, demand, and price of gas be determined by market
forces. 7
24. 106 S. Ct. 1169(1986).
25. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Commission of Kansas, 240 Kan. 638, 732
P.2d 775 (1987).
26. ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla.
1986).
27. Unitization is one way to protect correlative rights and achieve the goals of conservation
without violating the NGPA. Professor Pierce has also propounded this theory. See PIERCE, supra
note 12. Unitization is the joint, coordinated operation of all or large parts of an oil or gas reservoir
by the owners of the separate tracts overlying the reservoir. J. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND
GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS, at I (1986). It has been argued by many that states should require unitization
of gas fields to eliminate the conflict between correlative rights and the ultimate physical recovery
of gas as well as to maximize the economic efficiency of gas production in a commonly owned
reservior. Id. at 27; S. MACDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1971).
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Elimination of the Pipeline Companies' Monopoly on Marketing Gas
The Natural Gas Act did not require gas pipelines to be common
carriers. That means that interstate gas pipelines have had no duty to
provide transportation services to one who wished to ship gas through
the pipe. Indeed, gas pipelines have long owned almost all the gas trans-
ported in their systems, either because an affiliate produced the gas or
the pipeline bought it for resale.
Although Congress provided for the reform of regulation of gas pro-
ducers through the NGPA, it did not take any step toward reforming the
regulation of pipelines. Nevertheless, many came to realize that if the
pipelines were allowed to continue to control access to their systems, the
goal of the NGPA to have supply, demand and price of gas set by the
market could not be fully realized. Rather the market would work best
if the many sellers of gas (producers) could deal with the many buyers
of gas (individual gas consumers or even LDC's). However, this could
not occur unless the parties could be assured that the gas bought could
be transported to the consumer.
At the end of 1985, the FERC took a major step toward providing this
assurance. FERC issued a comprehensive regulation, commonly called
"Order 436,"2 s which provides very strong incentives to pipelines to
allow any person access to their unused capacity.29 In effect, this major
piece of regulatory reform separated the task of buying and selling the
gas from the task of transporting it. Because the NGPA has not required
pipelines to be common carriers, and because none of the pipelines chose
to do so voluntarily, the pipelines had retained a monopoly over both the
marketing of gas and the transportation of gas. FERC recognized that
while the transportation of gas was a natural monopoly in many geo-
graphic areas of the U.S., the marketing of gas was not.
Subsequent to FERC's historic step, many states have likewise required
their intrastate pipelines and LDC's to free up their excess pipeline ca-
pacity for hire.3" Since the LDC's are the last link in the chain to the gas
end user, it is imperative that they provide non-discriminatory access to
their system in order for the competitive market in the sale of gas to
function.
28. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§2, 147, 250, 284, 375 and 381). Order
436 was appealed in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
court upheld the order in most respects, and the FERC issued an interim rule and statement of policy
to respond to the failings which the court found in Order 436. 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987).
29. FERC did not have the authority to order pipelines to carry gas for others for hire, so it was
relegated to using a carrot-and-stick approach to achieve this end.
30. These states include California, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin.
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The Encouragement of an International Market for the Purchase and
Sale of Natural Gas
As described in more detail in a preceding article, the present policy
of the U.S. is to encourage a competitive international market for the
sale and purchase of gas. The reasons behind this are numerous, but
perhaps the primary reason is the desire to encourage less dependence in
the U.S. on foreign oil. Many industrial gas users have dual fuel capability
and can burn oil as well as gas. If the price of oil, which is bought and
sold in an internationally competitive marketplace, drops significantly
below that of gas, users will switch to oil. Some will burn imported oil.
If gas is being traded in an internationally competitive marketplace, it is
much more likely that the price of gas will be competitive with that of
oil, leading, of course, to less switching. Dependence on foreign gas is
not a concern at this point because the only significant foreign gas used
in the U.S. is Canadian, and Canada is a politically trusted trading partner.
The Specter of Competition in the Transportation of Gas
The FERC has signaled its intent to inject competition into the trans-
portation of natural gas, at least by interstate pipelines. In its Order 436,
it encouraged pipelines to compete with one another by eliminating tra-
ditional certification procedures (barriers to entry) for pipelines willing
to expand their services and even construct new facilities, if they were
willing to accept the full risk of the proposed expansion. 3 FERC realizes
that this regulatory provision provides incentives for competition where
none existed before. It offers consumers the possibility of having a choice
in not only the sale, but also the transportation, of natural gas. FERC
was perhaps not prepared for the outcry from many state regulators at
this piece of regulatory reform. States are concerned that interstate pipe-
lines may "cream-skim"-for example, run a spur to a particularly large
industrial customer now being served by an LDC. This "by-pass" of the
LDC would reduce the revenues otherwise received by the LDC. To the
extent that those revenues covered fixed costs of the LDC, state regulators
realized that they would be in the position of deciding whether to increase
rates or decrease the LDC's profit to make up those lost revenues. FERC
is proceeding slowly in its implementation of this section of its Order
436.
THE NEW DESTINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRY
These major policy changes in the regulation of natural gas have already
31. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Part C, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,408, 42,467, 42,488 (1985) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§2, 154, 157, 161, and 284) (proposed May
30, 1985).
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altered the functioning of the market. The changes have affected each
member of the industry a bit differently. As we have seen in the preceding
articles, each member has its own complaints about the difficulties that
the process of changing to the new regime has put it to. The following
is an overview of the new destination that each segment of the industry
is headed for, and the hurdles that each are crossing to get there.
PRODUCERS
Competition with Resultant Pressure to Sell at the "Market Price"
U.S. domestic gas producers are now more clearly than ever in com-
petition with each other and with foreign producers to sell their gas at
the "market price." Prior to the regulatory changes, natural gas had been
bought and sold at the wellhead through long-term contracts, typically
ten or twenty year terms. Today, contracts are varied. There is a spot
market which usually involves a thirty day spot sale contract. But most
contracts fall into the middle ground between the twenty year and the
thirty day spot sale. The producers and their purchasers are aware that
the sale of gas is evolving into a diverse and competitive market.32 Because
of this, gas contracts are more flexible today, providing for shorter terms
and more market sensitive pricing provisions. 3
These regulatory changes come at a hard time for most producers, as
the first article explains. With excess production and declining demand,
increasing competition with oil and a decrease in oil prices, many pro-
ducers face a risk of loss in the market. Some, at least theoretically, have
contract protection against this risk through long-term contracts with
pipeline companies with high take-or-pay provisions. However, pipelines
unable to sell the gas have stopped taking and paying. Not suprisingly,
this leads to acrimony and often litigation. Many producers and pipeline
companies have entered into take-or-pay settlements and contract rene-
gotiation. FERC's Order 451, which provides producers with some pros-
pect of raising the cost of their old gas, has been an aid to acheiving
settlement of some take-or-pay claims. 4
Uncertainty As to the Nature of Protection of Correlative Rights
Producers face uncertainty as to whether (and how) states will continue
to provide them with protection of correlative rights to produce gas in a
common pool. Although some producing states have amended their pro-
32. Work is being done to establish a futures market for natural gas.
33. For an excellent discussion of the nature of wellhead sales agreements in today's market see
J. Piccone & D. Reimer, NATURAL GAS WELLHEAD AGREEMENTS, ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FOUND.,
INST. ON NATURAL GAS MKTG. (1987).
34. Id.
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rationing and common purchaser regulations in a purported attempt to
comply with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Transco, it appears
that their amendments do not eliminate the failing that the Transco Court
criticized, that is, the state regulation's indirect effect on price of gas.35
This uncertainty will remain until state regulators take steps to definitively
eliminate their influence on the price of gas, or until the federal courts
decide enough of these cases to give us a better idea of how far state
laws and regulations can go in regulating the production of natural gas.
New Business Relationships and Opportunities
With pipeline companies no longer the only purchasers and resellers
of gas, producers have the opportunity to become marketers of gas them-
selves. Whether or not they choose to become marketers, they are doing
business with new members of the industry, either marketing companies,
gas brokers or individual end-users.
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES
Competition in the Marketing Function
Pipelines traditionally bought gas from producers to whose wells they
were hooked up and sold it to LDC's and sometimes directly to end-
users. Deregulation of gas prices and FERC Order 436 have combined
to create a new group of purchasers. These include marketing companies,
brokers, and end-users and simply mean more competition for pipelines
trying to market their gas. Just as with producers, this competition comes
at a difficult time for pipeline companies. Many of them had entered into
long-term contracts with high take-or-pay requirements and high gas
prices. This supply situation collided with decreased demand and the
decrease in market price of competing fuels (both oil and gas) compet-
itively priced from other sources of supply. Pipeline companies' hopes
that consumers might help them weather these financial burdens were
dampened in 1984 and 1985 when FERC issued Orders No. 380 & 380-
C.36 The former prevented pipelines from including unincurred com-
modity charges in their minimum commodity bills, and the latter elimi-
nated minimum takes from pipeline minimum bills."' Today, many pipelines
find themselves not taking or paying for the gas they contracted for,
resulting in litigation and/or renegotiation. FERC recently issued a policy
35. See, e.g., Texas Railroad Comm'n Reg. 3.30 and 3.34, as amended by Order of Feb. 9,
1987; and N.M. Energy and Minerals Dept., Oil Conservation Division, Order No. R-8441 (May
7, 1987).
36. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984). Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 380-C, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,625 (1984).
37. Id.
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statement which aims to distribute the burdens of take-or-pay liability
among producers, pipeline companies and consumers.3"
Pipelines have responded to these changes in their business in a variety
of ways. One of the more significant ways has been the creation of
marketing affiliates, leaving the transportation business in a separate cor-
porate entity. Although this was a logical step for pipeline companies to
take, subsequent dealings between the marketing and transportation af-
filiates have engendered much controversy, as discussed below.
A second response of the pipelines to the new market has been new
acquisition policies. To the extent pipelines are still acquiring gas for
themselves, they must ensure that they have the ability to meet fluctuating
demand and market prices.
New Role of Transportation for Hire
The separation of the pipeline's role as transporter from its role as
marketer of gas presents new problems as well as new opportunities for
the companies (and their regulators). Now that the marketing of gas is a
competitive service, the pipeline with its monopoly on transportation has
the potential to exclude marketing competitors. This is particularly a
concern where the pipeline has a marketing affiliate. Allegations of anti-
competitive practices relating to marketing affiliates of interstate pipelines
have already been received by the FERC. In response, in November
1986, FERC initiated an inquiry into these alleged practices and solicited
comments on possible remedies.39 Three of the possible remedies under
discussion include: separately incorporating marketing affiliates of pipe-
lines, providing for separate management and employees of the marketing
affiliate, and even forbidding a marketing affiliate from doing business
with its pipeline.'
Another problem that arises when pipelines transport their own gas,
as well as that of others, is how to assure a fair and reasonable allocation
of the costs of transportation between the two services. 4' The FERC is
looking into this problem in the context of pipeline dealings with affili-
ates.42 But it has also been a subject of controversy in other proceedings
before the FERC.43
38. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 and 35,539
(1987).
39. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,982 (1986).
40. Id.
41. This problem would be eliminated if pipelines became common carriers rather that contract
carriers. However, this solution is fraught with political and practical difficulties.
42. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,982 (1986).
43. 51 Fed, Reg. 41,983 (1986).
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Increased Incentives to Expand Services and Facilities
Pipelines that have traditionally served part of a market being served
by one or more additional pipelines now face increased risk that their
traditional purchaser will not only buy gas from someone else, but will
have it transported over someone else's pipeline. This is exactly the
situation being faced by the El Paso Natural Gas Co., as explained in a
preceding article. In this case it is particularly troublesome to El Paso
because the new source of gas is a foreign producer and the new source
of transport is an affiliate of the producer. However, in today's market-
place this situation could probably just as easily occur where the com-
peting source of gas is another domestic producer and the competing
transporter is an unrelated pipeline. The conclusion to be drawn is that
any pipeline faced with potential competition from another pipeline is
likely to be looking for new markets to serve.
This is illustrated quite aptly by El Paso, which wishes to serve the
newly developed enhanced oil recovery market in California. Diversifi-
cation into new markets is logical, since it dilutes the risk of loss from
any one particular customer. To the extent that the pipeline is willing to
incur the risk itself of serving a new customer, FERC made it clear in
Order 436 that it will favor such a development by expediting the process
of receiving a certificate to serve. FERC has not, though, given any
similar indication that it would favor an attempt by pipelines to diversify
if the risk were to be placed on the customers of the pipeline.
INTRASTATE PIPELINES AND LOCAL DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES
Competition from Interstate Pipelines
As discussed above, FERC favors the extension of interstate pipeline
systems or facilities where the pipeline is willing to assume the risk of
the extension'. This "threat" is enough to cause intrastate pipelines and
LDC's (particularly those serving large industrial customers with high
load factors) to question whether they are providing transportation and
gas at a price equal to or lower than that available from the nearby
interstate pipeline. Thus, federal regulatory reform efforts have had a
direct impact on local entities and have caused them to act as if they were
competing even if the competiton is not yet-"actual.""
Most state regulators are also aware of the changes in federal regulatory
philosophy and are beginning to demand that their LDC's take advantage
of them. One step state regulators are taking to assure such action on the
44. This type of action is consistent with the contestable market theory. See K. Nowotny, Bulk
Power Deregulation and the Requirements of Competition, Meetings of the Western Economics
Association (July 9, 1987) for an explanation of this theory.
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part of their LDC's is to mandate least-cost gas purchase. In preceding
articles we have seen that this has been lauded by consumers and casti-
gated by pipelines.
State Regulatory Reform
In those states which have mandated contract carriage by their intrastate
pipelines and LDC's,45 we are seeing changes in those companies quite
similar to those discussed above regarding interstate pipelines. In sum-
mary, these intrastate pipelines and LDC's face competition in their tra-
ditional marketing of gas, and they have responded in the same manner
as interstate pipelines have.
Intrastate pipelines and LDC's also face the problems of adjustment
to their new role of providing transportation for hire. In this area there
is one additional problem unique to the intrastate system. Where the LDC
is an affiliate of the intrastate pipeline, there exists a potential for the
intrastate pipeline to favor its other purchasers with lower cost gas, rather
than flowing it through to the LDC. In recognition of this, some state
regulators have forbidden the intrastate pipeline to release any of its gas
priced below its system average to other customers.4 However, state
regulators have apparently not yet begun to deal with the possibility that
an intrastate pipeline may make new purchases of gas in favor of its other
customers, or may favor its other customers in its contract renegotiation
efforts.
CONSUMERS
Many consumers now have the prospect of a choice in source, and
perhaps transporter, of natural gas. In some areas, smaller consumers
have joined together and pooled their gas demand to negotiate a better
direct contract with an alternative source of supply. It remains to be seen
whether residential consumers will eventually be able to take advantage
of these changes in the market either by banding together themselves or
by having marketers attempt to group them into a single purchasing entity.
HAVE THE REGULATORY REFORMS BEEN APPROPRIATE?
Public policy toward the natural gas industry has changed dramatically
in the last seven years, as has the industry. The following section will
discuss whether the change has been worth it and whether we are headed
in the right direction.
45. See supra note 30.
46. See, e.g., Rules Regarding the Transportation of Natural Gas by Public Utilities for Buyers
and Sellers of Natural Gas, N.M. Public Serv. Comm., General Order No. 44, § 14(E) (1985).
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The Choices
Before we can evaluate whether the right decisions are being made,
we need to know what other possible decisions are available. The three
major regulatory reforms of deregulation of gas prices, elimination of the
pipeline companies' monopoly on marketing gas and encouragement of
an international market for the purchase and sale of gas, discussed supra,
were taken to achieve the goal of having supply, demand and price of
natural gas determined by market forces, rather than the government. The
fourth regulatory reform effort to streamline certification procedures for
pipelines willing to shoulder the risk of new service was taken to inject
more competition into the transportation of natural gas.
The only alternative to having the market regulate the supply, demand
and price of gas is to have the federal or state government do it. There
does not appear to be any justification for the latter since the gas business
is one in interstate commerce. As to the former, no generally accepted
theory of regulation supports price controls. The sale of gas is not a
natural monopoly. The purchase of gas, to the extent that pipelines are
relieved of their role as exclusive purchasers, is not a monopsony. To the
extent that producers in the future may make "excess profits," the tax
system is a better means of redress than price controls. Although in the
past, regulation allocated gas when a shortage arose, regulation was the
cause of the shortage. Shortage should not occur in a free market if the
sale and purchase of gas continues to function. Even if it were to occur,
it would not justify the imposition of price regulation today. Finally, our
past experience with regulation of supply, demand and price of natural
gas was disastrous. No member of the industry or affected public pre-
senting his views in the preceding articles has called for a return to those
days. In short, deregulation of the sale and purchase of natural gas seems
to be the appropriate way to go.
FERC's approach of injecting more competition into the transportation
of gas cannot be equated with deregulation of transportation. Indeed, it
is not even deregulation of entry into the transporation service. Rather,
FERC is taking a more relaxed approach to entry regulation, in the trans-
portation of natural gas and will evaluate the advisability of additional
competition on a case by case basis. In these cases, one might expect
that those opposed to additional entry will argue that it is a natural
monopoly market and that the market could not support more than the
existing number of pipelines. Allowing competition, the argument con-
tinues, where there is sure to be destruction of at least one entrant wastes
resources and should not be permitted by the regulator. On the other hand,
those arguing in favor of additional entry will first attempt to show that
the market could support it and, in the alternative, that any potential waste
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is justified by the ability of the competitive process to choose the best
service provided.47
In any event, in the absence of a particular case, we do not yet have
to evaluate the desirability of allowing additional entry into the trans-
portation industry. Therefore, let us turn our attention to the problems
that will arise as we continue along the road towards a competitive mar-
ketplace in the purchase and sale of natural gas.
Problems
There are four regulatory hurdles which must be overcome if the process
of reform is to proceed smoothly.
Reform of State Prorationing and Common Purchaser Regulation
Producing state regulation under prorationing and common purchaser
acts, which set production levels and require prorated takes from a com-
mon pool without regard to price or the existence of contracts, interferes
with the market functioning of the sale and purchase of gas. If the goal
of a functioning market is to be achieved, these regulations must be
reformed. A regulatory regime must be developed which achieves the
goals of conservation and protection of correlative rights without artifi-
cially affecting demand and price of gas. Unitization is one method to
achieve this goal.48 There may be others. Compulsory unitization has not
been popular with producers or producing state legislators.49 There is no
reason to think that this attitude will change overnight. Most likely, reform
in this area will take some time.
The Problem of Allocation of Joint Transportation Costs
As we have seen, the federal government and many state governments
have provided for contract carriage. This requires a pipeline to hire out
the excess capacity in its pipe but also permits it to continue to resell gas
and carry it over its own pipeline system. This regulatory program means
that regulators must allocate joint pipeline costs between the two types
of transactions. This in turn may compound the difficulty for regulators
of determining the appropriate allowed rate of return for pipelines."
One way to eliminate this problem would be to forbid the pipeline
47. See BREYER, supra note 2, at 31 (1982).
48. See supra note 27.
49. See, e.g., J. WEAVER, UNrrIAToN OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 37-136 (1986).
50. For discussion of these problems, see P. CARPENTER, A. JACOBY, AND A. WRIGor, NATURAL
GAS PIPELINE REGULATION AFTER FIED PRICE REGULTION, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Center for Energy Policy Research, 91 (Mar. 1983).
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from reselling gas. This, in effect, would change the pipeline from a
contract carrier to a common carrier. Needless to say, this reform would
raise other issues and other problems which are beyond the scope of this
article. It is more likely that regulators will continue to struggle with
various methods to achieve an appropriate allocation of joint costs.
The Threat of Anti-Competitive Behavior
Interstate pipelines and intrastate pipelines that carry gas for others but
also have marketing affiliates have the potential to discriminate in favor
of their marketing affiliates or in favor of some other marketing entity in
granting access to their pipeline system. Federal and state regulators have
recognized the existence of this problem and are taking steps to see if it
can be prevented. 5 Depending on how regulators set transportation rates,
there may also be a potential for pipeline companies to favor their affiliated
marketing companies with discounted transportation rates. For example,
the FERC allows flexible transportat~on rates under Order No. 436. By
selectively flexing a higher or lower rate to an affiliated shipper, it is
possible that a pipeline could assure a sales market or certain capacity to
its affiliate." One way to eliminate these problems would be to prohibit
pipeline companies from having marketing affiliates. This is indeed being
considered by the federal government. It is the old problem of utility
diversification into non-utility businesses in a new context.
The Conflict of Interest Problem Between Affiliated Intrastate
Pipelines and LDC'S
In states where an intrastate pipeline is affiliated with a local distribution
company and sells gas to that LDC, there is potential for a conflict of
interest in the sale of that gas. Where the intrastate pipeline also markets
to purchasers other than the LDC, the pipeline may have an incentive to
purchase lower cost supplies for its non-affiliated purchasers and sell its
higher cost gas to the LDC. It may be difficult for regulators to either
legally or practically detect the existence of such a practice. Again, this
is a classic conflict of interest situation that regulators routinely become
involved in when they have a vertically or horizontally integrated utility.
To say that it is a classic problem, though, is not to say that it is easily
solved.
51. See, e.g., FERC Inquiry into Alleged Anti-competitive Practices Related to Marketing Af-
filiates of Interstate Pipelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,982 (1986) and N.M. House Bill 444, as amended,
ch. 93, 38th Legislature, Ist Session (to be codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-6-4.1 (1987 Cum.
Supp.)), a statutory amendment enacted in the wake of a vigorous debate between intrastate pipelines
and independent marketing companies over alleged pipeline anti-competitive behavior.
52. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,984 (1986).
Fall 19871
858 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL (Vol. 27
CONCLUSION
The natural gas industry is well on the road to a more competitive and
more complex future. All the signs indicate that it is headed in the right
direction. Surprisingly, perhaps, governmental policy in all branches of
the federal government and in many states supports having market forces
decide the supply, demand and price of gas. Governments cannot sit back,
however, and idly watch their regulatory reforms play out. There are
significant, new regulatory problems created by these reforms remaining
to be solved.
